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Frank Umbach
Following Pakistan’s recent reve-lations about trading nuclearfor missile technology with
North Korea, the crisis on the Korean
peninsula has intensified. As six-way
talks were scheduled to resume in late
February, the World Food Program—
which has long been feeding six mil-
lion North Koreans to stave off starva-
tion—appealed for more aid,as inter-
national donors began to balk at
pouring humanitarian money into a
country that spends its own money on
weapons.
The current crisis began building
in October 2002, when North Korean
negotiators admitted to American
counterparts that the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea had a se-
cret nuclear-weapons program based
on highly-enriched uranium (HEU).
The last previous crisis had blown up
in the mid-1990s amid signs that a
known North Korean plutonium pro-
gram was being used to develop nu-
clear weapons. At that point interna-
tional monitoring was set up, with
permanent cameras at the country’s
nuclear plants.
In January 2003, following its ad-
mission that it had an HEU program,
North Korea became the only state
ever to leave the Nuclear Nonprolifer-
ation Treaty. It expelled the inspectors
from the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) and had all electronic
and other monitoring devices re-
moved from its known nuclear instal-
lations. In July and October of 2003
Pyongyang declared that it had long
since succeeded in reprocessing its
8,000 nuclear fuel rods, an operation
that would have yielded enough plu-
tonium to produce several warheads.
Indeed, the United States, China,
Japan, and the IAEA estimate that
Pyongyang already has between two
and six nuclear warheads.
North Korea’s strategy of nuclear
extortion is by no means new; for
more than ten years Pyongyang has
practiced nuclear blackmail.
In exchange for giving up its nu-
clear ambitions,North Korea’s leader-
ship demands the establishment of
diplomatic relations and a bilateral
non-aggression treaty with Washing-
ton, along with payment to it of sub-
stantial economic subsidies.
Once before, in the 1990s’ con-
frontation, the United States and the
international community in effect re-
warded Pyongyang’s strategy of nu-
clear extortion economically and, in-
directly,also politically.This,however,
weakened global arms-control efforts
by applying a double standard. In the-
ory, the United States and the interna-
tional community are now, once
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again, left with options of targeted
military strikes, economic sanctions,
or negotiations.
Many observers prematurely ex-
pected the United States to carry out
military actions against North Korea
like those in Iraq. But this is unlikely;
the military risk is too high, and
Washington needs the support of its
allies and other countries in the re-
gion, especially China. Moreover, the
12 million residents of South Korea’s
capital, Seoul, are located only forty
kilometers from the border; they
would run the risk of being obliterat-
ed within a few hours or days by a
counterblow from North Korea’s con-
ventional forces or by its chemical or
potentially even biological weapons.
Besides, the secret services of sever-
al nations no longer exclude the possi-
bility that North Korea has a second
nuclear reprocessing plant tucked
away somewhere in a subterranean
bunker that is neither known to the
United States nor detectable by spy
satellites.This could even pose the risk
of a North Korean nuclear response.
Nor is a renewal of economic sanc-
tions any more promising. Given the
harsh living conditions in the Demo-
cratic People’s Republic, sanctions
could easily lead to a rapid collapse of
the regime and loose uncontrolled
streams of refugees and other chaos.
The only remaining option is the
path of negotiations. The United
States still insists on multilateral talks,
while North Korea until recently in-
sisted on exclusively bilateral talks
with the US. At the six-way negotia-
tions that finally began among the two
Koreas, the United States, Japan, Rus-
sia, and China, Washington is de-
manding a “complete, verifiable, and
irreversible” halt of all North Korean
activities aimed at producing nuclear
weapons before the United States will
be willing to discuss any economic or
other assistance to North Korea.
While the United States State De-
partment has softened its position
somewhat and adopted a more flexi-
ble quid-pro-quo approach (as in the
ten-point plan of Republican Con-
gressman Curt Weldon), Pentagon
hardliners who believe in forcing
regime change still seem to oppose it.
However, the US is now willing to
begin negotiations and set the inspec-
tion question to one side for the time
being.
Pyongyang’s Violations
That said, it is not primarily Wash-ington, but Pyongyang, that is to
blame for the new crisis. The country
has violated several international
agreements with its secret nuclear-
weapons program: the 1994 Geneva
Agreed Framework, the 1992 North-
South Declaration of the two Korean
States on the Denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula, and the 1992 IAEA
Safeguard Agreement.No other coun-
try has so often and so provocatively
violated international arms-control
agreements, even to the point of
threatening nuclear war.
Given this history, it is doubtful
whether a bilateral non-aggression
treaty with the US could really pro-
vide the North Korean leadership
with an effective security guarantee
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against preventive military strikes by
the United States. Such a treaty would
contradict Pyongyang’s traditional se-
curity perception and founding father
Kim Il Sung’s  propaganda-laden
juche (self-sufficiency) ideology.
Pyongyang also seems to perceive the
US intervention in Iraq as a potential
model for American action against
North Korea, with enforced disarma-
ment as a prelude to enforced regime
change. This makes the odds for suc-
cessful negotiations very low. Indeed,
President Kim Jong Il was quoted in
June 2001 as having told his military
that such agreements and treaties can-
not really prevent war and secure
peace.
Moreover, even if the United States
were extremely flexible—and even
given the greatest optimism for the
six-way talks—it is hardly realistic to
expect an effective agreement on veri-
fication. The reason is not so much
that North Korea might not be willing
to renounce nuclear weapons;
Pyongyang would still retain effective
weapons (especially chemical
weapons) for a retaliatory strike
against Seoul. Much more important
is the issue of verification; for such an
agreement to work, the same IAEA
conditions (which Pyongyang already
rejected in the past) would have to
apply to North Korea as to Iran and
other nuclear threshold states. In con-
trast to the last deal in the 1990s,
North Korea would be required not
only to open up self-designated instal-
lations for IAEA inspections, but
would also have to agree to an addi-
tional protocol that would give the
IAEA access to any suspicious installa-
tions for verification without prior
notice. This concession would be nec-
essary not only because North Korea
has little credibility, but also because
these verification regulations are an
integral component of the IAEA’s
global verification regime and be-
cause reduced inspections would set a
double standard that would under-
mine global arms-control efforts.
In this sense what is at stake in the
negotiations with Pyongyang (as in
those with Tehran) is no less than the
future of global arms-control
regimes.Yet even the most starry-eyed
optimists cannot at present imagine
that Pyongyang would agree to such
an inspection regime, since it would
entail monitoring North Korea’s more
than 10,000 subterranean bunkers.
Almost from one day to the next,
North Korea would have to transform
itself from one of the most closed po-
litical systems to an almost entirely
transparent country.
Dangers of Resignation
Must the international communi-ty then resign itself to coexis-
tence with a North Korea equipped
with nuclear weapons, just as it did
with Pakistan and India? Such an out-
come would have grave consequences
for regional stability and security in
Northeast Asia. It could lead to an ac-
celerated regional arms race and per-
ceptions of mutual threat,making cri-
sis management on the Korean penin-
sula even more unpredictable.What is
more, the first priority of the six-way
talks would have to be the cessation of
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all exports of technologies that might
be used to produce nuclear weapons
and ballistic missiles and only secon-
darily the issue of Pyongyang’s nu-
clear-weapons option.
By far the greatest damage from the
failure of these negations would be
sustained by global arms-control
regimes and multilateral disarma-
ment efforts. They would, in effect,
find complete defeat staring them in
the face. Global security policy would
need to define either entirely new in-
struments or would again have to re-
treat to the old categories of nuclear
strategic deterrence; yet the old theory
of rational-actor deterrence would
not necessarily prove effective in the
case of North Korea.
Only the United States and China
might have the influence to change
North Korea’s policies—and it is not
clear that even they do. US policies
have been largely based on the belief
that time is on the side of Washington
and it can simply wait for North Korea
to collapse. Until recently, on the basis
of its intelligence information, the
Bush administration has tended to
dismiss North Korean claims that it
has restarted its nuclear-weapons pro-
gram at Yongbyon by reprocessing
previously sealed and monitored
spent fuel to extract plutonium for a
nuclear-weapons option. It cannot
verify whether North Korea has done
so somewhere else, however. If it has,
this might prove to have been another
intelligence failure like that with the
Taepodong missile launch; in that case
US intelligence dismissed informa-
tion that North Korea was able to
launch a three-stage ballistic missile
shortly before Pyongyang actually did
so in August 1998.
For China, the present crisis on the
Korean peninsula can be seen as the
most important litmus test for Bei-
jing’s evolving foreign and security
policies and the measure of whether
and how far China is willing to take
over regional and global responsibili-
ty for international crisis manage-
ment. While China has recently be-
come more active in Korean policy as
it has come to perceive Pyongyang as
a potential security liability—as
shown by the severely strained bilat-
eral relationship with North Korea in
the past few years—a divided Korea
still seems to have advantages for
China. Beijing therefore currently
prefers the unstable status quo to any
regime change.
Nonetheless,whatever the outcome
of the recent crisis on the Korean
peninsula, it will necessarily lead to
long-term changes in Beijing’s policies
toward the Korean peninsula, China’s
overall foreign and security policies,
and the future of multilateralism in
Northeast Asia.
The Libyan Surprise
So far Col. Muhammar Qaddafi’ssurprising shift in forfeiting
Libya’s nuclear-weapons program
and inviting UN inspectors into Libya
to verify cessation of activities—thus
revealing thriving Pakistani exports
of nuclear-weapons materials and
know-how to countries like North
Korea—has had no immediate im-
pact on Pyongyang. The six-party ne-
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gotiations demonstrate once more,
however, that on the densely-popu-
lated Korean peninsula there is no al-
ternative to jaw-jaw. The only hope
seems to rest on a quid-pro-quo strat-
egy for lengthy negotiations that
might ultimately lead either to a radi-
cal change of views and policies on
the North Korean side or else to the
kind of regime change from within
that the Bush administration would
like to see.
Close cooperation among Wash-
ington, Seoul, and Tokyo is thus the
crucial prerequisite for any future
negotiations with North Korea.
Pyongyang apparently sees its 2003
policies of nuclear crisis as having
failed to achieve anything beyond en-
suring the regime’s survival. For the
future that might not be enough—for
Pyongyang, Beijing, or anyone else in
the six-party talks or in the wider re-
gion.Most recently,Pyongyang is even
disputing that it ever admitted having
an enriched uranium program.
This backtracking has strength-
ened doubts in South Korea and Bei-
jing about whether North Korea really
does have a covert program to enrich
uranium for nuclear weapons. A re-
cent private US delegation in North
Korea could confirm only that the
spent fuel facility was empty and that
the 8,000 spent fuel rods had indeed
been removed to a new and unknown
place. One member of this group,
Siegfried Hecker, a former director of
the US nuclear research center in Los
Alamos, is convinced that the North
Koreans have the equipment and the
expertise for reprocessing as well as
enriching uranium in order to pro-
duce plutonium—though he is not
yet convinced that they also have the
expertise to build nuclear warheads
for missiles.Yet America’s intelligence
credibility is also increasingly being
called into question in the case of
North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and
capabilities, given the intelligence de-
bacle in the apparently overblown es-
timates of Baghdad’s arsenal of
weapons of mass destruction.
Under these extremely difficult cir-
cumstances the best case hope is that
the next six-party-talks might at least
lead to a more regular and institution-
alized process that could drag on in-
definitely.
Given North Korea’s domestic poli-
cies and the likely ramifications of the
nuclear crisis on Sino-Japanese and
other relations beyond the Korean
peninsula, it is not clear whether
China and the rest of the world will
have the patience just to wait and pur-
sue inconclusive negotiations until
such time as North Korea might fol-
low the lead of Libya and Iran and
fundamentally changes its thinking
and policies. Yet at the end of the day
the rest of the world has little choice.
Trying to force regime change from
outside would seem doomed to in-
crease regional instability and trigger
unintended and unwanted conse-
quences.
A N A L Y S E S
1/2004 T R A N S AT L A N T I C  I N T E R N AT I O N A L E  P O L I T I K 83
